Against this background, I propose first to mention certain issues regarding the content of the articles, and then, at rather greater length, to discuss some of the questions raised about their character and future.
I. THE CONTENT OF THE ARTICLES

The Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Obligations as an Organizing Device
An initial point concerns the distinction between primary and secondary obligations as the central organizing device of the articles. This approach, of course, goes back to Ago, and (uniquely) he is cited in the commentary by name, and his own expression of the distinction quoted with approval: "[I] t is one thing to define a rule and the content of the obligation it imposes, and another to determine whether that obligation has been violated and what should be the consequences of the violation."8 To be precise, the key idea is that a breach of a primary obligation gives rise, immediately by operation of the law of state responsibility, to a secondary obligation or series of such obligations (cessation, reparation ... ). The articles specify the default rules that determine when a breach occurs and, in general, the content of the resulting secondary obligations. In their final form they also specify what other states may do to invoke responsibility, by claiming cessation or reparation or, in default, by taking countermeasures.
The distinction is subjected to an illuminating critique by the editors of this symposium.
They note that the category of secondary rules is said to comprise-like the common law rules of civil procedure-"a distinctive set of rules that apply across the various substantive areas of law."9 But they suggest that the distinction is confusing and may even be illusory.
Admittedly, the distinction between the content of a substantive obligation and the consequences of the breach of an obligation does not entail that the legal system in question has any general ("trans-substantive") rules of responsibility. To pursue the analogy with the common law approach to civil procedure, it might be that a legal system resolved the problem of the consequences of breach by allowing a claimant, as it were, to assert the breach and the (hypothetical) tribunal to sort out remedies on an ad hoc basis, case by case. If in the course of time categories of cases arose, they would probably be experiential, not general. In that event, even if the forms of action were subsequently abolished and apparently general legal ideas about civil obligations began to flourish in the law schools, we might still find the forms of action ruling from behind the scenes.
Whatever the position concerning the development of the common law of tort and crime,"' I do not think this example corresponds to the development of the international law of responsibility. Whether the original imperative was natural law or the sanctity of promises, there seems to be no trace of a formulaic approach to responsibility in early international law. Neither natural law nor treaty practice distinguished some specific domain where responsibility for breach applied, as compared with others where it did not. Rather, there emerged a general conception of the rights and duties of states, and of the consequences of breaches of those rights."1 No doubt, rights and duties could be developed by treaty or custom in particular ways for particular states; so, too, might the range of available responses to noncompliance. To this extent, the distinction between primary and secondary obligations was, and is, somewhat relative. A particular rule of conduct might contain its own special rule of attribution, or its own rule about remedies. In such a case, there would be little point in arguing about questions of classification. The rule would be applied and it would normally be treated as a lex specialis, that is, as excluding the general rule.
But if the distinction is somewhat relative, it was all the same enormously useful in defining the scope of the articles. Indeed, it provided the key to their completion as well as their scope. It may be supported by a number of reasons, principled as well as pragmatic.
The first, historical point is that it provided a way out of the impasse into which the ILC was led in the 1950s by the work of the first special rapporteur, F. V. Garcia-Amador. Although the field of injuries to aliens and their property was and remains important, achieving any consensus on it at the time would have been impossible-as became clear on the only occasion Garcia-Amador's work was debated.12 Clearly, a strategic retreat was called for.
This quasi-political consideration, however, was not the main point, and the retreat from one area paved the way for a major advance. Ago's distinction responded to what the ILC commentary now refers to as the principle of independent responsibility.13 There is no international legislature. Treaties are not statutes of general application. There is no possibility of codifying the substantive international law of obligations in a general way. It could only be done in specific fields (e.g., the law of the sea) by considerable effort, and all such codifications will be partial by definition, as is the UN Convention of 1982. One cannot tell states, comprehensively, what obligations they are to have. In specific fields, codification of a kind has proved valuable, but on analysis these fields involve numerous relatively standardized transactions that occur on a regular basis and are regarded as matters of obligation (e.g., diplomatic and consular relations), or collective values of conformity with certain common standards in order to ensure orderly interaction (e.g., the law of the sea), or some other feature that calls for coordinated multilateral treatment. Many parts of international law do not fall into these categories. For example, in the field of economic relations there is no reason why rights and obligations should not be differentiated, and they certainly are, notwithstanding the World Trade Organization. Even in certain fields where the underlying values may be thought to be universal (e.g., human rights), in fact a large and increasing number of instruments, global, regional and bilateral, has developed, imposing a range of obligations. These cannot be replaced by a single text, and there would be no point in the ILC's compiling them, even if it had the resources.
There was a more subtle point still. To focus on the substantive law of state responsibility in the field of diplomatic protection was to give that area priority. It might have been thought to imply that international law contains subareas where the principle of responsibility applies (as with contracts and delicts) and other areas where it does not, or at least does so only to the extent specified (as with the tort of breach of statutory duty in the common law). On that basis, whole areas of international law would have been seen as containing merely directive principles, or at best as reflecting some analogy with public law, which could be enforced only by reprisals (a sort of decentralized criminal law) and not by claims of responsibility. No doubt, merely directive principles, or regulations noncompliance with which does not produce responsibility, are possible.'4 But there is no presumption that international obligations in any field are of this character. In theory and in practice, the international law of responsibility is applied across the field of international obligations. It comprises areas that-in terms of domestic analogies-may be seen as like those of contract and tort, and others that might be seen as analogous to public law. But the "public" and the "private" are indistinguishable; the treaty is an undifferentiated instrument, and so is the law of responsibility. Thus, Ago's move to a set of articles dealing with secondary obligations associated with breach was a step in the direction of profitable generalization. In principle, it reflected the situation as it had developed in international law.
Bodansky and Crook go on to suggest that the ILC may have been inconsistent in treating the rules of attribution as "secondary," while the issue of fault or damage as a prerequisite to responsibility was treated as "primary":
One couldjust as well argue ... that fault and injury relate to whether a particular rule of conduct has been violated (and hence are secondary rules), and that attribution is part of the complete specification of a primary rule (i.e., by addressing the actors to whom the primary rule applies).
... The articles reflect the ILC's belief that trans-substantive default rules exist regarding attribution, justifications, and remedies, but not fault or injury-hence, the former issues are included in the articles but not the latter.'1 But of course the articles are not a repository for all possible secondary rules. Admittedly, if international law had a rule that, despite conduct apparently inconsistent with an international obligation, actual damage had to be shown before responsibility arose, this could be properly classified as a secondary rule.16 The common law has such a rule for negligence but not for breach of contract; it therefore has no general rule requiring damage for responsibility. In international law, there are rules whose purpose is to prevent actual damage to the state or its nationals. But there are also rules of conduct that are independent of actual damage, and even certain rules where the eventual occurrence of damage is in principle unknowable and untraceable to any given breach (e.g., wrongful emission of chlorofluorocarbons). From an undifferentiated base, international law has to perform-or attempt to perform-all the different functions that developed legal systems perform. It may or may not do so with eventual success, but it cannot be prevented a priori from the attempt. It is not the function of the law of state responsibility to tell states what obligations they may have.
By contrast with the rules relating to damage, the rules of attribution set out in part 1, chapter II seem to have no rival of a general character. Whatever the range of state obligation in international law, the ways of identifying the state for the purposes of determining breach appear to be common, and only in exceptional cases (e.g., Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture17) may special rules of attribution be devised. In the absence of express provision 15 Bodansky & Crook, supra note 7, at 781 (footnote omitted). 16 to the contrary, a given obligation (in general terms) will be interpreted as an obligation on the state to do that which conduces to the performance of the obligation. Rarely (and never, as far as I am aware, by implication) is the state taken to have guaranteed the conduct of its nationals or of other persons on its territory, even when it has entered into obligations in completely general terms. The rules of attribution are thus an implicit basis of all international obligations so far as the state is concerned.
It results from this analysis that the distinction between primary obligations and secondary rules of responsibility is to some extent a functional one, related to the development of international law rather than to any logical necessity. Since the ILC was not engaged in posterior analytics, that does not seem to be much of a criticism. The ILC articles presume that international law is a unified body of law, with common characteristics that operate in similar ways across its various fields (subject, of course, to lex specialis derogations created by particular states in particular settings). Whether this is a desirable approach will be a matter of debate. In response to the fragmentation of international law, many see unity and coherence in international law as virtues. But a one-size-fits-all approach may come at a certain price, by inhibiting the elaboration of more variegated international norms-liability rules, property rules, and so forth, each with their own characteristic set of remedies-which can be used in a more precise way to pursue a complex range of community goals.19 I think it is true that the articles "presume that international law is a unified body of law." But this "unification" can be understood only in a limited sense. For example, the articles do not presume that conflicts of obligations cannot occur. The ILC discussed whether to address conflicts of obligations, for example, in terms of their effect on the content of the secondary rules of reparation, and decided that the issue could not be resolved by any general formula.20 Instead, the formulation of the forms of reparation was made somewhat more flexible, for this and other reasons. with the relations between treaties.2' Such conflicts, according to many theorists, cannot occur in integrated legal systems governed by the rule of law. If they can occur in international law, that may indicate that it is not such a legal system-but not that it is not some kind of legal system of the international community as a whole, and of states members of that community inter se. In this sense at least, it is a unified legal system. Beyond this point, the degree of unification or conflict in the international system is both a political question and (in relation to existing regimes) a question of interpretation. In my view, there cannot be, at the international level, any truly self-contained regime, hermetically sealed against bad weather.22 But this is not a question on which the articles needed to take a position. A genuinely self-contained regime would be a special lex specialis, a lex specialis to the nth degree. As a general matter, if states wish to create such a regime (still governed by international law), there seems to be nothing to stop them.23
The Lex Specialis
But these questions are essentially theoretical. What is perfectly clear is that there can be many variants on the lex specialis option, from rather minor deviations up to the (nearly) closed system. As noted already, whether any particular rule operates in derogation from the default rules in the articles is a matter of interpretation: the articles lay down no presumption in favor of the general at the expense of the particular. According to the commentary, it is for the special rule to determine the extent of exclusion, the test being whether there is "some actual inconsistency... or else a discernible intention that one provision is to exclude the other."24
In light of these considerations, it seems to me inaccurate to describe the articles as adopting "one-size-fits-all" rules.25 On the contrary, with the qualifications made above, the tailoring seems to me as flexible as the rules of interpretation. No doubt, one cannot specify the results of that process-but at least the relation between the general and the special seems to be right as a matter of principle. 2' Except a peremptory norm of general international law. A group of states could not allow themselves, behind the walls of a self-contained regime, to enslave or torture people. Presumably, all self-contained regimes are subject to this limitation (in which case they are not self-contained Weiss suggests that "by keeping the definition narrow, the Commission may have intentionally left undisturbed the right of 'non-injured states' to make less formal claims that a state has breached its international obligations, as well as any rights of individuals and nonstate entities to make less formal claims."31 In fact, the articles do not cover the question of invocation of responsibility by nonstate entities, although Article 33 expressly reserves that possibility; I will return to this issue below.
As to states, it is true that the articles intentionally left open the possibility that third states (neither "injured" nor "interested" in the sense of Article 48) might nonetheless remind a defaulting state of its obligations. This would be in effect a diplomatic form of "solidarity measure," not covered by the saving clause in Article 54. It is expressly referred to in the commentaries, which note that
[t] here is in general no requirement that a State which wishes to protest against a breach of international law by another State or remind it of its international responsibilities in respect of a treaty or other obligation by which they are both bound should establish any specific title or interest to do so. Such informal diplomatic contacts do not amount to the invocation of responsibility unless and until they involve specific claims by the State concerned, such as for compensation for a breach affecting it, or specific action such as the filing of an application before a competent international tribunal, or even the taking of countermeasures.32
In practice, protest and similar measures may be called for, irrespective of any issue of responsibility, so as to preserve possible rights in the same or analogous cases, or indeed to preserve the effect of the underlying rule (the state as legislator rather than claimant). There is thus a range of possibilities, which accounts for a degree of complexity in the formulations. On the other hand, each of the cases envisaged is distinct andjustified in its own terms, and no further simplification of the categories seemed possible. However, several points of explanation are necessary. First, in using the phrase "commensurate," the International Court did not intend to contradict the decision of the tribunal in the Air Services Agreement arbitration (which it had already relied on) to the effect that the underlying principle can be taken into account in the overall balance.37 In the words of the commentary, it is legitimate to take into account "the importance of the interest protected by the rule infringed and the seriousness of the breach."38 Second, the reference to "purely punitive" countermeasures tends to confuse the issues of subjective motive andjustification. The motivations of governments are notoriously difficult to assess: a countermeasure may be disproportionate even when the government has no ulterior motive, and proportionate even if the intention was to harm. Conversely, the mere fact that the target state declares itself unmovable on the issue does not preclude the injured state from taking countermeasures. Countermeasures are not to be directed only at the fainthearted. Rather, the standard is objective, taking into account the rights of the states affected, including the injured state. And third, proportionate countermeasures may be taken to ensure not only cessation, but also reparation in accordance with part 2.
Countermeasures and Dispute
With these qualifications, I do not think that modern international law allows purely punitive countermeasures, or that the shift (if it was a shift) in the Court's language from proportionality to commensurability was intended to produce any change in the law in that regard. In the passage cited, the Court actually used the term "proportionate," which is also the title to Article 52. The advantage of the synonym "commensurate" is that it helps to stress the element of qualitative equivalence, which was such an important factor in the Gabikovo-Nagymaros case itself.
A related issue concerns escalation. On the one hand, this is a major difficulty with countermeasures. Often, measures taken by one side produce still further measures on the other, and the dispute is exacerbated. The articles were formulated with this difficulty in mind, in an attempt to limit escalation. But, on the other hand, they do not envisage a purely static situation. Evidently, the injured state must take into account the response of the target state, both initially and subsequently, and the imposition of countermeasures in stages was never meant to be excluded, provided always that the other conditions for countermeasures, especially proportionality, are met at the time they are taken and for as long as they are taken. Thus, I do not agree with Bederman that the articles exclude "limited forms of escalation . .. especially in light of the need to 'induce' a malefactor state to abide by its international obligations."39 At the same time, they also provide for de-escalation, both in their emphasis on the reversibility of countermeasures (another lesson from the Court in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros) and in Article 53, requiring termination of countermeasures "as soon as the responsible State has complied with its obligations under Part Two in relation to the internationally wrongful act."40
The two principal controversies during the second reading concerned the procedural conditions for taking countermeasures and the taking of countermeasures by states other than the injured state-that is, by states with a legal interest in compliance, as covered by Article 48.
As to the former, the guiding principles had been usefully set out by the tribunal in the Air ServicesAgreement arbitration.41 In a world that subjected legal disputes to general and effective international adjudication, including prompt access to effective provisional measures, there would be no room for countermeasures, except possibly emergency interim measures pending resort to the court. Of course, we are far from such a situation in general international 37 In their final form, the articles allow the immediate taking of urgent countermeasures that may be necessary to preserve the injured state's rights; subject to that, the disputing states are obliged to negotiate and the countermeasures must be suspended if the dispute is effectively submitted to a competent international tribunal. Bederman raises "the problem caused when a tribunal, having once indicated provisional measures, later decides that it does not have jurisdiction over a dispute."42 In that case, the dispute would no longer be "pending" before the tribunal in terms of Article 52 (3) (b), and the suspension of countermeasures would no longer be required.
More difficult situations, however, can be envisaged. For example, the International Court might refuse to order provisional measures on the sole ground that it finds no appearance, even prima facie, of jurisdiction, but nonetheless decline to strike the case from its list.4" There may be a lacuna here. Despite the lack of any prospect of an actual determination on the merits, for the time being the case is still in a sense "pending" before the Court, and it is for the Court, not the parties, to determine whether it has jurisdiction. But since under Article 52(3) (a) the requirement of suspension does not arise unless the wrongful act has ceased, the lacuna (if any) seems to be a relatively minor one. Perhaps it is a tribute that the vice of countermeasures should pay to the virtue of international adjudication, but if so, it is a small and rather contingent tribute. 44 The issue that caused the most difficulty in the final stages was that of countermeasures taken by states other than the injured state. In 2000, on the basis of a review of rather scanty practice, I proposed an article avowedly de legeferenda that covered both "collective countermeasures" taken at the request of and on behalf of an injured state, and "solidarity measures," that is, measures taken by Article 48 states in (what they perceive to be) the general interest, where there was no individual injured state.45 Although the proposal received a degree of support both within and outside the ILC, some governments strongly opposed it. In the end, discretion seemed the better part of valor, particularly having regard to the interaction of these issues with the general mandate of the Security Council. So-called collective countermeasures were dropped from Article 54. "Solidarity measures," as Martti Koskenniemi calls them, are 42 Bederman, supra note 5, at 826. 43 In its order ofJuly 10, 2002, in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Rwanda), available at <http://www.icj-cij.org>, the Court declined provisional measures on grounds of probable lack ofjurisdiction, but nonetheless retained the case on the list. There is practically speaking no chance thatjurisdiction will be upheld, but meanwhile the dispute is in some sense "pending" before the Court, and it will presumably take some time (up to two years) before a final decision onjurisdiction. Despite many reforms in the Court's practice and procedure, notably under the presidency ofJudge Gilbert Guillaume, this example highlights the problem of the absence of any summary procedure before the Court. 44 According to the commentary, Article 52 (3) "is based on the assumption that the court or tribunal to which it refers hasjurisdiction over the dispute and also the power to order provisional measures." Commentaries, Art. 52, para. 8. Arguably, where there is not even an appearance of jurisdiction, the court is not in a position to deal with the case on the merits, and the obligation to suspend countermeasures would not apply. In that case, we might say, it is only the dispute over jurisdiction that is "pending" before the court. 45 
884
[Vol. 96:874 now dealt with by a comprehensive saving clause, leaving the matter for development in practice. By this stage, the limits even of progressive development of state responsibility had evidently been reached. 46 At a general level, Bederman asks whether the attempt of the ILC to restrain countermeasures may not produce the paradoxical effect of encouraging them.47 It would not be the first time that a decision to regulate some unilateral act in the interests of controlling it produced such unintended effects: both treaty reservations and straight baselines have probably proliferated beyond the expectations of the International Court at the time of allowing them.48 But the ILC decided the risk was worth running-and governments in the Sixth Committee broadly supported that view.
II. THE CHARACTER AND FUTURE OF THE ARTICLES
A second group of issues concerns the character and future of the articles. How do they relate to the tradition of international law, and to its future? Inevitably, codification grows out of past experience, with all the limitations that may entail; on the other hand, essays in progressive development may assume a direction to "progress" that proves illusory or ephemeral. The point is touched on in many of the contributions, one way or another.
The Articles as a Product of the Civilian Legal Tradition
An initial question concerns the relation of the articles to distinctively "civilian," as distinct from "common law" approaches to responsibility. As Bodansky and Crook note, four of the five special rapporteurs on state responsibility were trained in a civil law tradition. Moreover, the ILC's general approach after 1963 was seen from the common law world as rooted in civilian thinking on the law of obligations, and as highly abstract, even arcane. In that respect a contrast was often drawn with the "sound" common lawyer's pragmatism underlying Humphrey Waldock's work on the articles on the law of treaties.
As so often with comparative law generalizations, the contrast seems to me overdrawn. It is true that early influential pronouncements on state responsibility-certainly in the period after 1918-bore the unmistakable stamp of continental European lawyers such as Dionisio Anzilotti and Max Huber, and that this emphasis was highlighted and developed in particular by Ago. On the other hand, civilian lawyers held no monopoly. For example, British and American lawyers were influential in the mixed commissions of this and earlier periods. Referring to one of the earliest major controversies over a subject arguably within the scope of the articles, it is not clear that the disagreements as to "direct" and "indirect" injury that surrounded the Alabama arbitration49 related to any particular continental schools of thought.
More fundamentally, the general categories of international law-treaty and custom, obligation and breach-were already adapted to a considerable degree to the international state system of the time. were precisely not analogous to statutes of general application-which meant that treaties could themselves be modified or even superseded by subsequent custom or by tacit consent.
Diplomatic negotiations usually focused on the proposed rule of conduct rather than on the particular consequences of its (still hypothetical) breach-and this is true whether the context was the neutrality of Belgium, the immunity of ambassadors, the abolition of the slave trade, or the most-favored-nation clause.
Moreover, the content of the law of state responsibility, at least in the important field of injury to the persons and property of aliens, was not based on any codified approach, or even on any general principle of law. It was dependent largely on diplomatic correspondence or decisions of arbitral commissions in relation to particular fact situations. In some respects at least, it resembled the evolution of the common law of torts before Donoghue v. Stevenson." For example, we are still working out the content of the "international minimum standard" on a case-by-case basis-as witness current developments in the application of Articles 1105 and 1110 of the North American Free Trade Agreement and their equivalents in bilateral investment treaties. It is doubtful whether a single generally applicable principle has emerged in that field in whose terms the decisions can be explained.
Other factors are also relevant: a certain convergence of thinking across the common lawcivil law divide (at least in Europe);51 an increased willingness by common lawyers to think in terms of general categories of the law of obligations; and a certain tendency to assume the existence of a single "civilian approach," whereas on points relevant to the articles, different European countries turned out to approach the matter in quite different ways.'2
If there was a criticism to be made of the first-reading articles, it was not that they addressed issues from a civilian (as distinct from a common law) approach but that they addressed nonissues (e.g., the question of "capacity" to breach international law: see former Article 2), or were overrefined (e.g., the negative rules of attribution, all strictly pleonastic), or tried to force substantive rules of international law into a particular form (former Articles 21-26), or used inappropriate domestic law analogies (former Article 19). Each of these issues was addressed on second reading, and the first-reading articles were significantly amended or simply deleted. Comments from governments on these changes did not in any way reflect a civilian-common law divergence, nor did approaches within the ILC itself. I believe the outcome is simpler and cleaner, and that the articles now say more or less what can be said in general terms about the secondary rules of state responsibility. But they are not, if they ever were, to be identified with any particular national legal tradition or school.
The Articles as Limited to an Interstate Approach to International Law
A more serious criticism is that the articles reflect an outdated statist approach to international law, being essentially based on a bilateral state-to-state conception, modified (if at all) only around the fringes. This is a theme explored by Weiss, according to whom the articles "should have done more to recognize the expanded universe of participants in the international system entitled to invoke state responsibility."53
The True, this acknowledgment, important though it is, was not accompanied by any detailed regulation in the articles of the ways in which state responsibility may be invoked by nonstate entities. This subject could have been brought within the scope of the project, which covered the responsibility of states and was not confined to their responsibility to other states. But there were several reasons for not venturing further. The first-reading articles had not done so, as noted already. The ILC had a compelling interest in completing the project on time, given that it had dragged on for so many years. In addition, the project certainly did not extend to the responsibility of entities other than states. This is a disparate topic: the ILC has just begun its study of the responsibility of international organizations,6' but that will leave various other issues untouched. The responsibility of nonstate entities for breaches of international law raises novel and difficult questions, and could have given rise to significant controversy. Diplomatic protection had already been carved off from the articles (likewise not haxving been treated on first reading). Conceptually, it seems that diplomatic protection should be regarded as a form of invocation of state responsibility; but it is at least a distinct form of invocation, which was being separately treated.62 Above all, there was a need not to raise so many new issues that the acceptability of the text as a whole might have been put in question. The frank acceptance in Article 48 of the various ways in which states may invoke responsibility in some general interest, and the clear rejection of the narrow approach to standing adopted by the Court in South West Africa, Second Phase,63 taken together with Article 33, amounted to substantial progress, but it was approaching the margins of acceptability for some influential states. For example, the ILC fought off demands by states (and some of its own members) to use the formula "the international community of States as a whole." This phrase would have suggested that only states are members of that community, and might further have implied that issues of international responsibility can only arise as between states. Instead, as the commentaries explain, "the international community as a whole" is a more inclusive category.64 In these various ways, the interests and concerns advocated by Weiss were given a textual basis and an explanation, without endangering the economy (or the survival) of the text as a whole. 
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[Vol. 96:874 in dealing with standard lawmaking texts:68 that can be seen, for example, from the rather unhappy process that has attended the ILC's articles onjurisdictional immunity of states and their property, now belatedly back on the agenda. The lesson of that and other cases has not been lost on the ILC. Its recommendation on the state responsibility articles paralleled an earlier recommendation concerning the articles on succession of states with respect to nationality, which were likewise annexed to a General Assembly resolution pending subsequent consideration of a possible diplomatic conference.69 Constitutionally, the preferable way of handling any lawmaking text may be the standard method of a diplomatic conference followed by a treaty that is subject to ratification (or not) by governments. This approach is evidently preferable where the text in question is, for example, the statute for an international criminal court, which imposes itself on individuals and requires due process of law; or, more generally, where the text must be embodied in domestic law to have its effect. This was the case with large parts of the Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, and would be the case with any eventual product of a diplomatic conference on jurisdictional immunities. By contrast, the secondary rules of state responsibility are only indirectly applicable in national courts, and they do not require legislative implementation. In effect, in such a field the ILC's work is part of a process of customary law articulation, which-as Caron argues-requires care in its recipients but does not contravene any general principle. 
